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ABSTRACT 
 
Author’s intention was to examine the possibility to investigate win-win-win papakonstantinidis 
model in order to develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales 
promotion campaigns. Based on previous theoretical extensions (Spais and Papakonstantinidis, 
2011; Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009), this study presented an integrated 
bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal allocation of a promotion budget in a 
cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. This integrated bargaining 
solution analysis included: a) three (3) adjusted utility functions, considering the parameters of 
sales response budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the  marketing channel 
member’s trade promotion goals; b) the referee solution, the optimal solution for the “three 
players” and the constraints; c) the definition of the third win in terms  of a continuous 
sensitization process and perfect information; and d) the presentation of the potential outputs from 
a bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among 
“A”, “B” and “C” parties/players for different sales promotion offerings. Encouragingly, the 
review of the modern literature and the four (4) critical case studies of cooperative marketing 
programs confirmed the need for a win-win-win approach in cooperative sales promotion 
planning in vertical marketing channels. 
 
Keywords:  Cooperative Advertising; Cooperative Sales Promotion Campaign; Bargaining Solution Analysis; Win-
Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
e strongly believe that the well known frameworks for the study of a cooperative marketing 
campaign process by Fux, Mathieu and Myrach (2007), Merzenich (2005), Schumacher and Meyer 
(2004) may be seriously considered in order to study cooperative promotion management campaign 
process in vertical marketing channels in both planning and coordination level. AMA Dictionary 
(http://www.marketingpower.com/_layouts/Dictionary.aspx?dLetter=V) lists the term “vertical cooperative 
advertising”, (which seems to be used in the broader sense for all promotional activities), defining that it is the 
advertising in which the retailer and other previous marketing channel members (e.g., manufacturers or wholesalers) 
share the cost. Yan (2010) argued that cooperative promotion plays a strategically important role in marketing 
programs. Very close to Yan thesis, He, Prasad and Sethi (2009) underlined that cooperative promotion is an 
important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions in marketing channels. On the other hand, 
bargaining seems to be critical for marketing channel coordination, e.g., for vertical cooperative promotion 
(Ailawadi et al., 2009; Huang, Li & Mahajan, 2002) or resolving channel member conflicts as well as for setting 
trade terms such as transfer special prices and margins, according to Coughlan et al. (2001). There is a significant 
literature on constructs such as bargaining problem (Xie & Wei, 2009) and tendency to conflict (Zhuang, Herndon & 
Zhou, 2005). In contrast, the normative and behavioral principles governing marketing channel dependency and 
coordination regarding the tendency to sovereignty, tendency to improvement and mistrust are relatively unexplored. 
W 
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Encouragingly, as the literature reaffirms the critical role of bargaining in marketing channels (Coughlan et al., 
2001), we strongly believe that the Papakonstantinidis win-win-win conceptualization as a bargaining solution 
analysis will receive a significant attention in the marketing literature in the nearest future. 
 
According to Yan (2010), Huang, Li and Mahajan (2002), Li et al. (2002), Huang and Li (2001), 
cooperative advertising has been used by many industries for decades and continues to play a key promotional role 
for many manufacturers, retailers and retail customers. According to He et al. (2011), more than $25 billion was 
spent on cooperative advertising in the USA in 2007 compared to the total expenditures in 2000 that were estimated 
at $15 billion and $900 million in 1970  -  nearly a four-fold increase in real terms and approximately 25%–40% of 
all manufacturers used this arrangement (SeyedEsfahani, Biazaran and Gharakhan, 2011; Nagler, 2006), The above 
evidence can be seriously considered in nowadays, if we monitor the latest trends in the media business, where 
many leaders of the media market characterize the cooperative advertising as the fastest growing category in media 
business. The successful case of the “MNG’s co-op contest” and its alliance with MultiAd Recas (MNG/Media New 
Group, one of the largest newspaper companies of USA) proves the above (see 346% increase from cooperative 
advertising sales in comparison with the previous year), considering that many media companies are struggling to 
find revenue solutions during this period of economic recession. This increase in spending volume and the overall 
increase in the significance of cooperative advertising seems to motivate scholars, researchers, authors and thinkers, 
globally to explore more the role and use of cooperative advertising in practice, the last years. 
 
Although literature clearly shows the raising issue of reinforcing customers’ participation in marketing 
management activities of customer-centric organizations (such as: idea generation, idea screening, concept 
development and testing, process design, test marketing, building promotion campaigns etc.), (e.g. Awa, 2010; Hu, 
Jianyou & Na, 2010; Fang, 2008; Payne, Storbacka & Frow, 2008; Chen & Lu, 2007; Etgar, 2007; Lusch, Vargo & 
O’Brien, 2007; Galbraith, 2005; Hip & Grupp, 2005; Piller, 2005; Alam, 2002; Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001; Sheth, 
Sisodia & Sharma, 2000; Johne & Storey, 1998; Sundbo, 1997; Youngdahl & Kellogg, 1997; Wilkstrom, 1995; 
Dabholkar, 1990; Bowen, 1986; Lovelock & Young, 1979) unfortunately there is no theoretical framework 
including the customer (as a “third party” or “third player”) in a cooperative marketing or promotion planning 
process. The concept of including the third party, as the third “win” in a traditional “win-win” approach for 
cooperative marketing and promotion campaigns was presented for the first time in the marketing literature in 2009 
(Spais, Papakonstantinidis & Papakonstantinidis, 2009). 
 
Research aim, initial assumption and research question 
 
The intention is to examine the possibility to investigate win-win-win papakonstantinidis model in order to 
develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns. Based on 
previous theoretical extensions (Spais & Papakonstantinidis, 2011; Spais, Papakonstantinidis & Papakonstantinidis, 
2009), this study will present an integrated bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal allocation of a 
promotion budget in a cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. This integrated 
bargaining solution analysis will include: a) adjusted utility functions, considering the parameters of sales response 
budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the  marketing channel member’s trade promotion goals; b) the 
referee solution, the optimal solution for the “three players” and the constraints; c) the definition of the third win in 
terms  of a continuous sensitization process and perfect information; d) the presentation of the potential outputs from 
a bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” 
parties/players for different sales promotion offerings; and e) the “sensitized game” in order to deepen understanding 
of the bargaining characteristics.  The basic initial assumption of this study is that different problems met in 
cooperative promotion planning requires adjusted bargaining solution analyses based on the win-win-win approach 
(including the “third win” for customers) and should not based on the traditional win-win. 
 
According to the available empirical evidence, the SMEs seem to be oriented to the Sales School rather 
than the Communication School regarding to the goals of promotion campaigns (Vrontis, Thrassou & Czinkota, 
2011; Tsiotsou, Rigopoulou & Kehagias, 2010; Bazini, 2008; Demetriou, 2008; Elmazi & Bazini, 2008; Thrassou & 
Vrontis, 2006; Huang & Brown, 1999) and sales response budgeting method seems that becomes quite popular 
(Akanbi & Adeyeye, 2011; Du, Hu & Ai, 2007; Miller & Pazgal, 2007; Thrassou & Vrontis, 2006; Little, 2004; 
Luxton, Hodge & Reid, 2002). Based on the above, the research question is if the integrated bargaining solution 
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analysis of the upgraded ‘win-win-win spais-papakonstantinidis-papakonstantinidis’ model can be proven of high 
theoretical and practical value for the understanding and implementation of such analysis for vertical cooperative 
sales promotion management decisions? 
 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a methodological tool for conflict resolution, especially in 
the case of decision-making, or in forming "instant reflection winning strategies" the BARGAIN (which is the 
frame). For the needs of the study, we adjust the conceptualization, in order to deal with the development of vertical 
cooperative promotion management decisions. It has to prove that building a strong competitive advantage in a 
market mainly depends on the trust links among the partnerships in the vertical marketing channels. 
 
Cohesion in partnership in the supply chain may be measured by the diversification Rate (R*) from strict 
rules: from this point of view, customers intervention should be useful, so as to diversify these “rules” at customized 
level adjusting them to their needs, wants, consuming identity, including communication codes, customs, ethics, 
culture. The win-win-win methodology, as a marketing channels’ development model, should facilitate customers to 
“readjust” bargaining rules in each market, through a sensitization process: Customers are defined as a discrete 
spatial/cultural entity at its sensitization process’ limit. 
 
Definitions and assumptions 
 
Win-win perception: It is based on when each side of a dispute feels they have won. Since both sides benefit from 
such a scenario, any resolutions to the conflict are likely to be accepted voluntarily. The process of integrative 
bargaining aims to achieve, through cooperation, win-win outcomes. 
 
Win-win-win perception: It is based on the assumptions of information accessibility and diffusion that characterize 
the modern globalized societies as well as the complexity in the decision-making values that the “third win” (the 
“C” factor) could unlock a series of obstacles. Another assumption is that the individual (although his/her doubts) 
must believe that there is a “third” distinguishable part in the bargain (based on behaviorist analysis through the 
“neural networks”). Sensitization is introduced (regarding the integrated information) as a main variable of the 
bargain (the “third invisible part of the negotiation”/ the “C” factor). Sensitization” may concerned as information, 
thus changed the 2 parts imperfect information, into a complete information as Harsanyi’s (1973) conditional 
probabilities claims. It is about an encephalic hard process in the bargain, which smoothes the angles of conflict or 
the shares/utilities (according to Nash).The “third win” functions as an umbrella, which conjoins different “dipolar 
relationships”. Especially, in the business context, it must be understood that the existence of a “distinguishable 
entity”, depends upon the degree of understanding and sensitization of knowing better the other polar (the 
partnerships in a supply chain), even through pecuniary values. 
 
Bargaining problem. A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals (Von Neuman & Morgenstern, 
1947), who have the opportunity, either to be competitors to each – other (win-lose), or to make coalitions, or even 
to create pure individual strategies, based on bargainers’ instant reflection behavior (win-win) (Crawford, 1997; 
Aumann, 1987; Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Nash, 1950). Nash (1951) focused on payoff shares/utilities combination. 
Bargain may result in either agreement or disagreement (Nash, Nasar & Kuhn, 2001). Utility expresses the 
constraint or the “fear factor” of disagreement for the negotiator who desires negotiations to be led in agreement 
more than the other one. Who needs more, negotiation leading to an agreement expects more utility, but – probably 
there is a loss in terms of “shares”, due to lack of risk. On the contrary, who is indifferent about “agreement” or 
expects less utility per unit, has- to win in “shares” under the dogma “the more risk, the more profit” (Crawford, 
1997). So, bargaining problem is mainly based on “Utility Theory” – a mathematical theory of the Neoclassical 
School of Thought, able to explain (satisfactory) the individual expectations/anticipations, of a possible outcome. 
Usually, it is expressed in the form of a mathematical function: f(u) = u
1/2
. Individual winning strategies are 
corresponding 1-1 to utilities U (A) and U (B) (Chun & Thomson, 1990). Utility theory of the individual is mainly 
based on the “concept of anticipation”. In the “two-person utility theory”, two (2) individuals in a bargain have the 
opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in more than one way. In its simple/initial version, no action, taken by 
one of the two individuals without the consent of the other can affect the well-being of the other one, but in real 
terms, there is only ONE decision, taken by the individual involved in a bargain. 
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Tendency to conflict. Refers to the tendency to competition between the two parts of the bargain with different 
expectations and controversial interests, results from the combination of: a) the case of the distinguishable entity, b) 
mistrust of each distinguishable entity, and c) the tendency to improvement. Based on the above, the motive of 
individual benefit leads with mathematic precision to the conflict, the tendency to sovereignty and from there to a 
competition climate, which is the corner stone of our economic system. 
 
Tendency to sovereignty. The reason for which it is repeated is stressing the importance of “the need” for 
sovereignty, which finally “shapes” the expectations. Therefore, we have the following paradox: the expectation 
determines the motive (individual benefit, sovereignty, competition etc.) and simultaneously “is determined” by the 
internal need of dominance-sovereignty, something that characterizes our natural world. 
 
Mistrust of each distinguishable entity. Deals with the intentions of the other. Two distinguishable entities have 
different expectations; otherwise, the expectation of each one would be identified with the expectation of the other. 
Therefore, there would not be a bargaining and, of course, no “conflict” and no “distinguishable entities”. If we had 
two “players” with precisely opposite interests and expectations, then the (A) would doubt the intentions of (B) and 
(B) would doubt the intentions of (A), (the “never-ending circle of expectations” by Varoufakis, 2001). 
 
According to Papakonstantinidis (2011; 2007; 2004a; 2004b; 2003; 2002) and the updated conditions by 
Spais and Papakonstantinidis (2011), describing the bargaining situations of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis 
model in cooperative sales promotion campaigns are summarized in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: The assumptions of the win-win-win spais-papakonstantinidis model 
1. In a bargaining situation, there are two distinguishable entities 
with different perceptions, attitudes, expectations and interests. 
These distinguishable entities, with different expectations, should 
be motivated (for individual benefit), so that they are activated and 
they transform the opposite expectations in opposite interests and 
from there in opposite “strategies of victory, or sovereignty”. 
2. Tendency sovereignty and the tendency of conflict are 
strengthened because of the bargaining problems and according to 
the theory only a “third win” (the “C” factor: the customer) could 
unlock these series of obstacles. The win-win-win theoretical model 
suggests that information accessibility and diffusion is crucial 
because of the relation between knowledge and behavior (the 
“interaction on bargain-behavior”). The different examples of 
knowledge types’ synthesis and the resulted 1-1 behavior may lead 
brand manufacturers to understand the bargain-behavior 
assumption, based on information given. From the other hand, 
brand manufacturers’ information may be the dominant result of 
this cross-related knowledge types: socialization, sensitization, 
externalization etc.. Thus, the hypothesis of bargain-behavior 
interaction is very important in building the suggested “C Factor” 
following the Harsanyi’s Bayesian Theorem original game can be 
replaced by a game “where nature first conducts a lottery in 
accordance with the basic probability distribution” (Harsanyi, 
1967). This extension is mainly based on the “Harsanyi’s 
transformation”, with a difference: original bargain between two 
can be replaced by a game, where the C Factor first conducts a 
lottery in accordance with the basic probability distribution. In 
addition, the “C” factor should be seen as the result of a “new” 
suggested bargaining behavior, coming from sensitization process. 
In such a context, the C party/player is given in terms of a 
continuous sensitization process, tending to sensitization itself, 
inside the customers. The heart of the analysis for a bargaining 
solution in a cooperative promotion campaign must be the 
configuration of how the “sensitized game” (G**) is formed and 
developed. 
3. The “C” party/player (for customers) produces a new 
behavioral type that converges the interests of both sides. 
By converting a binomial distribution (p, 1-p) into a 
trinomial distribution, (p1, p2 and 1-p1-p2) combined 
with 3 utility function “prices”. 
4. Interaction on bargain-behavior is one of the prevailing 
assumptions of the model, in accordance to the literature 
that evidence the strong relation between knowledge and 
behavior. 
5. As the managerial attitudes of brand manufacturers for 
customers’ participation in marketing planning activities 
impact the perceived value of the triple pole approach, this 
means that brand manufacturers see an adding value 
through the collaboration with the retailers, because there 
are strongly interested in accomplishing customer 
relationship goals. Based on this observation, we can 
safely interpret that the customers (as the “C” 
party/player) produce a new behavioral type that 
converges the interest of a brand manufacturer and 
motivate him for building marketing alliances in vertical 
marketing channels. 
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According to Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis (2009), the importance of this theory is 
arisen from the transfer of the pure trust theory to a marketing context, which can be achieved in order to analyze 
marketing phenomena of bargaining especially in cooperative promotion programs characterized by conflict and 
mistrust. Marketing phenomena refer to understanding of the bargaining problem resolution and the types of 
negotiation in which the marketing channel member and the business dispute the price, which will be communicated 
and the exact nature of the transaction that will take place and eventually come to an agreement in terms of a 
promotion management strategy. 
 
The theory considers the information accessibility and diffusion that characterize the modern marketing 
environment, and the complexity in the decision-making of marketing channel members values that the “third win” 
(the “C” factor: the customer) could unlock a series of obstacles. The individual (although his/her doubts) must 
believe that there is a “third” distinguishable part in the bargain. The ‘win-win-win papakonstantinidis’ theory 
supports the significance of the tendency to sovereignty, the tendency of conflict, which results from the 
combination of: a) the case of the distinguishable entity, b) mistrust of each distinguishable entity, and c) tendency 
to improvement in a vertical marketing channel.  
 
Based on the assumptions of the ‘win-win-win papakonstantinidis’ conceptualization, the limitation in 
contexts such as the cooperative promotion programs, as identified in previous study (Spais, Papakonstantinidis & 
Papakonstantinidis, 2009) is that utility assessment and cost-utility analyses such as costs/quality-adjusted expected 
profits model from the partnership for A and B parties/players and the C party/player (for customers/consumers) are 
frequently presented to demonstrate the value of many utility options in the marketing literature. The “C” 
party/player produces a new behavioral type that converges the interests of both sides, by converting a binomial 
distribution (p, 1-p) into a trinomial distribution, (p1, p2, 1-p1-p2) combined with 3 utility function “prices” 
(Papakonstantinidis, 2011). However, utility indicators require various methods that introduce significant 
methodological challenges, which directly influence the results and ensuing cooperative promotion management 
decisions in vertical marketing channels. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Based on the search in the Scopus Database (the largest citation database), we identify thirty-one (31) 
published research works the last 38 years (from 1973-2011) regarding to the research topic “cooperative 
advertising” (which was included in the titles of the works). The results are quiet interesting, as the following figures 
(1, 2, 3 and 4) show: 
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Figure 1: Published research works for “cooperative 
advertising” topic in a chronological order 
 
Figure 2: Published research works for “cooperative 
advertising” classified according to publication type 
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Figure 3: Published research works for “cooperative 
advertising” classified according to subject area 
 
 
The above figures show that the research activity about the topic of cooperative advertising seems to be at a 
very low level at the decades ‘70s, ‘80s and ‘90s. A significant increase of the research interest is presented after 
2005. Is quiet remarkable that published research works in cooperative advertising are presented in publications 
from different subject areas. 
 
According to AMA’s definition for the term “vertical cooperative advertising”, presented in the section of 
“Introduction”, bargaining seems to be a vital component of the term, it’s quiet impressing that only eight (8) 
published research works in “cooperative advertising” are covering bargaining issues research themes. A 
chronological order of these research works are presented in Figure 4. Table 2 summarizes information about the 
focus of these works, the publication names and their impact. 
 
Table 2: Examining the assumptions of the two theoretical perspectives from the two theories 
Title of the paper/focus Author(s) 
Publication 
year 
Publication name 
Impact (no. 
citations till 
Nov.2011) 
Coordination via cost and revenue sharing in 
manufacturer-retailer channels 
Kunter, M. 2012 European Journal of Operational 
Research (article in press) 
0 
A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and 
vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply 
chains 
Seyedesfahani, M., 
Biazaran, M., 
Gharakhani, M. 
2011 European Journal of Operational 
Research 
0 
Cooperative advertising, pricing strategy and firm 
performance in the e-marketing age 
Yan, R. 2010 Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science 
1 
Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-
retailer channel 
Xie, J., Wei, J.C. 2009 European Journal of Operational 
Research 
12 
Game analysis of cooperative advertising and ordering 
strategies in a supply chain under demand uncertainty 
Fu, Q., Zeng, S.-Q. 2008 Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu 
Shijian/System Engineering Theory 
and Practice 
0 
Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level 
supply chain when manufacturer offers discount 
Yue, J., Austin, J., 
Wang, M.-C., Huang, 
Z. 
2006 European Journal of Operational 
Research 
40 
Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-
retailer supply chains 
Li, S., Huang, Z., 
Zhu, J., Chau, P. 
2002 Omega 38 
An analysis of manufacturer-retailer supply chain 
coordination in cooperative advertising 
Huang, Z., Li, S., 
Mahajan, V. 
2002 Decision Sciences 38 
 
Based on the analysis of 56 published research works (Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 
2009), we can summarize the following findings: 
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advertising” that covers bargaining issues themes 
presented in a chronological order 
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 It seems that cooperative bargaining solution analysis results based on mathematical models can show us 
how to share the profit gain between the two parties in a vertical marketing channel and determine the 
associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties. 
The bargaining problems are the:  
  a) complex issue of promotion activities,  
  b) reputation that both parties bring to the bargaining table, and  
  c) perceived uncertainty in the lateral environment (competitive sector). 
 Regarding the tendency to conflict in vertical marketing channels: it seems that communication is the main 
source of conflict followed by different expectations and organizational structure. 
 Regarding the tendency to sovereignty in vertical marketing channels: there is a growing dominance of 
large retailers, which alter the traditional channel incentives. 
 Regarding the tendency to improvement for each member of the vertical marketing channel: it seems that 
bargaining without side payments is not effective as cooperation at reducing beggar-thyneighbor effects, it 
is a welfare-improving alternative to non-cooperation and is likely more practical in many situations. 
 There is mistrust between the members of the vertical marketing channels. 
 
Modern empirical evidence focus on the Customer as the third “player”/“pole” of the bargaining solution in 
cooperative sales promotion management process between the business and the marketing channel member (e.g. 
Gabrielsena and Roth, 2009; Bontems, Dhar and Chavas, 2007). 
 
Customer as the third “party”/“player”/“pole” of the bargaining solution in cooperative sales promotion 
management process between the business and the marketing channel member 
 
According to Misra and Mohanty (2008), bargaining can be seen as the process of distributing the gains 
obtained from trade among the participants of the trade. In the present context, the gains from trade (between the 
business or the manufacturer and the marketing channel member) are the total marketing channel profits. Since the 
wholesale price determines the proportion in which the gains from the trade (total marketing channel profit) are split 
between the marketing channel members, this wholesale price turns into the decision variable that is bargained over 
by marketing channel members. An alternative approach to measure bargaining power based on a Nash Bargaining 
Model between manufacturers and retailers has been recently proposed in the literature (Draganska, Klapper and 
Villas-Boas, 2010; Misra and Mohanty, 2008; Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003). 
 
There are two solution concepts for the above-mentioned bargaining problem - the co- operative approach 
and the non-cooperative approach (Muthoo, 1999). The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is the cooperative 
approach to bargaining problems in which the asymmetry in bargaining power between the parties is taken into 
consideration. Encouragingly, modern empirical evidence show the raising importance of the customer to be 
considered as the “third party” in delegated bargaining in vertical marketing channels (between the manufacturer 
and the marketing channel member), (e.g. Gabrielsena & Roth, 2009; Bontems, Dhar & Chavas, 2007). 
 
Optimal allocation of promotion budgets, the sales response as a budgeting method and break even sales 
analysis as parameters influencing bargaining solution analyses of cooperative sales promotion campaigns  
 
The optimal allocation of the promotion budgets is an issue of practical importance (Albadvi & Koosha, 
2011; Sriram & Kalwani, 2007). According to Gómez, and Rao (2009) and Gómez, Rao and McLaughlin (2007) the 
theme categories in promotion management can be classified as follows: i. the explanation of the growth; ii. the 
allocation of promotion budgets; iii. the extent of pass-through; iv. the balance of power between the business and 
the marketing channel members.  
 
Regarding to the extent of marketing channel’s member pass-through it seems that it ranges widely 
depending on the product category and retail price zone (e.g. Besanko, Dubé, and Gupta 2005; Tyagi, 1999). 
According to Cannondale Associates (2003), only 13% of manufacturers reported receiving a good value for their 
promotion expenditures and, furthermore, claimed that only about half of trade funds were actually passed on to 
consumers. Kumar, Rajiv, and Jeuland (2001) reported higher retail margins from promotion budgets depend on the 
product market characteristics, such as the retailer’s clientele and the heterogeneity in consumer search costs, and on 
frequency and budget of manufacturer deals. For example, Gómez, and Rao (2009), Drèze, and Bell (2003) report 
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that marketing channel members prefer discount-based promotions flexibility and manufacturers prefer 
performance-based promotions. Regarding to the research thrust related to the inefficient resource allocation due to 
the relative power between the business and the marketing channel member as discussed in research works (e.g. 
Stet, 2008; Paik & Bagchi, 2007; Scheffman, 2002; Sullivan, 2002), correlated to the distortions of demand because 
of the promotion campaigns. 
 
According to Sriram and Kalwani (2007) promotions besides their strong positive effect on a brand’s 
performance, they may also have some detrimental effects that need to be accounted for while allocating the 
marketing budget. Based on this observation, Naik, Raman and Winer (2005) consider interaction effects between 
advertising and sales promotions in addition to modeling their main effects. Regarding to the role of the budgeting 
method to the bargaining solution analysis for optimal budgeting in a cooperative sales promotion campaign, Dant’s 
and Berger’s study (1996) models the cooperative determination of franchisor's and franchisee's advertising 
contributions under conditions of differing perceptions of the sales response functions to advertising. The authors 
report such decisions are frequent source of conflict and the disagreements persist because of the win-win potential 
of vertical cooperative advertising is not well appreciated. Ending, regarding to importance of break-even sales 
analysis in bargaining solution analyses of cooperative sales promotion campaigns, it seems that indeed it plays a 
very crucial role (e.g. Roma & Perrone, 2010; Misra, 2008; Yue et al., 2006; Dant & Berger, 1996; Ailawadi, 2001; 
Morton & Zettelmeyer, 2000).  
 
Trade promotion goals influencing bargaining solution analyses of cooperative sales promotion campaigns  
 
The issue of trade promotion goals seems to be underlined in terms of bargaining process in a cooperative 
sales promotion campaign adopting win-win trade promotion approach by Drèze and Bell (2003). According to 
Sigué (2008), the long-term effects of promotions on sales are increasingly linked to the supposed shift of economic 
power within channels from manufacturers to retailers. However, formal knowledge about how they influence 
channel decisions under different promotional arrangements and the distribution of channel profits remains very 
sparse. Sigué’s findings indicate that retailers always invest in retailer promotions, while manufacturers may find it 
optimal not invest in consumer promotions. Economic power shifts from manufacturers to retailers when consumer 
promotions significantly expand the baseline demand in the long-term. Otherwise, manufacturers remain more 
powerful. Trade promotions or other profit-transfer mechanisms may be indispensable in easing conflicts over who 
should undertake promotions, especially when these promotions substantially increase future sales. Based on the 
literature review findings, we extend the three adjusted utility functions (1), (2) and (3) incorporating the parameters 
of sales response budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the independent variable of the trade 
promotion goals that lead us to the utility functions (4), (5) and (6). The extended adjusted utility functions and the 
constraints (8), (9) and (10) derived from the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model are presented in the next 
section. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
Critical cases for the study of promotion and promotion management phenomena seems to gain more and 
more the research interest by the members of the academic community for he marketing discipline as they realize 
the value of becoming critically aware of the practical wisdom of promotion events and relative managerial 
practices, in accordance to the critical case study conceptualization by Flyvbjerg (1991). 
 
Research method, unit of analysis and selection of critical cases 
 
The investigation of an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion 
campaigns based on the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is a non-researched area. In order to determine win-
win-win papakonstantinidis theoretical perspectives of the bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales 
promotion campaigns (regarding to promotion costs allocation), it is incumbent upon marketing scholars and 
researchers to take the above perspective, which allows these issues to be arisen. The use of the case study is 
considered to be of high value in our analysis because in the empirical studies none of promotion phenomena are 
very well understood (Cutler, 2004). The research method of case study is introduced in order to reveal very new 
constructs and to attempt to establish an initial understanding of the constructs and their relationship with other 
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constructs (Yin, 1994). Human activity is the basic unit of the analysis of the critical case. Incorporates notions of 
understanding such as mediation, motivation and culture. We believe that the four (4) cases of cooperative 
marketing programs may give valuable information. Information that deepen our understanding of the characteristics 
of vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns and, thus, the phenomenon studied can become more visible, as 
Stake (1994) argued. The different aspects of a context, from which a particular problem situation originates, can 
become increasingly visible and more accessible for a promotion management researcher (e.g. Spais, 2010; 2011). 
Based on Uden, Valders and Pastor‘s work (2008), we adopt the following linear process in order to gather the data 
in the critical cases: i) clarification of the purpose(s) of the activity system; ii) analysis of the activity system and 
production of the activity system; and iii) analysis of the activity structure.  
 
Evaluation and analysis of the data 
 
The data of activity structure analyses resulted from the performance of four (4) critical case studies 
analyses from September 1 to September 22, 2011 [in accordance with the methodological guidelines for qualitative 
content analysis in case study research of Kohlbacher (2006)] utilizing the conceptual categories of ―activity 
system for the understanding the nature and the characteristics of cooperative marketing and advertising campaigns. 
The findings of the cases’ analysis are presented in the following section. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Table 3 presents the summarized details in accordance to the unit of analysis described above: 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of data analysis of the four (4) cases of cooperative marketing programs based on the activity system 
structure in order to deepen the understanding of the characteristics of vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns 
Case: Destination Management Organizations (DMOs) and Small and Medium-Sized Tourism Enterprises (SMTEs) - 
Cooperative CRM in Alpine Tourist Destinations 
Title of the cooperative marketing program: “CRM in Alpine Tourist Destinations” 
 
Background: The success of tourist destinations depends largely on effective relationships between destination management 
organizations (DMO) and enterprises in alpine regions these are mainly small and family managed service providers. The use of 
internet technologies offers vast potential for developing a process of cooperative promotion of a region in order to attract 
travellers (Palmer & McCole, 2000, Williams & Palmer, 1999). Whilst online booking and reservation services can be said to 
have been accepted by service providers, the ‘e-Business Scoreboard 2005: Tourism’ indicates that technologically enhanced 
customer relationship management (CRM) is not ‘widely diffused among the smaller firms’. However, according to an 
explorative study in the tourism sector in Austria and Switzerland, expenditure on electronic marketing instruments, such as e-
mail marketing, is expected to increase by up to 30 % from the present state. A vast potential for improvement shows up in the 
performance measurement of marketing communication. In Switzerland and Austria 40% of the hotels, do not have processes for 
measuring the success of marketing activities. In addition to enterprise-specific marketing activities, cooperative marketing 
arrangements are quite common in tourist destinations and offer clear advantages for all involved participants. 
 
Source: Cooperative Customer Relationship Management (CRM) in Alpine Tourist Destinations 
Fux, M., Mathieu, D. and Myrach, T. (2007). Proceedings of the 2007 ECIS.  
Available: http://is2.lse.ac.uk/asp/aspecis/20070057.pdf 
subject tool object goal result 
DMO Internet technology is a 
major enabler for 
collaboration in customer-
oriented processes; in this 
case a corporate CRM 
infrastructure for tourist 
destinations 
Internet technology is a 
major enabler for 
collaboration in customer-
oriented processes; in this 
case a corporate CRM 
infrastructure for tourist 
destinations. Besides this 
crucial technological 
driver, the need for an 
increased customer-
orientation in marketing 
activities through the 
In the current model of 
collaboration in marketing 
campaigns, the 
service providers and the 
destination management 
organization determine a 
common understanding 
about the strategic 
objectives and their roles 
in the destination 
network. From a process 
perspective, it 
The campaign 
management system 
supports the planning of 
marketing activities by 
defining 
parameters such as target 
group, content, or 
schedules for the 
individual campaigns, and 
the service 
providers which could be 
invited to participate. The 
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utilization of knowledge 
about customers forces a 
change in marketing 
communications. This 
adaptation is required in a 
context of increased 
competition among tourist 
destinations and 
augmented problems of 
small- and medium 
tourism enterprises 
(SMTE) in handling 
customer-oriented 
processes in an electronic 
environment. By 
implementing a 
cooperative CRM 
initiative, a lacking 
motivation to cooperate of 
SMTE and technical 
interoperability of 
existing information 
systems, have to be 
considered as 
impedimental factors. 
is defined how the 
involved actors are 
planning, executing and 
analyzing marketing 
campaigns. These 
processes are supported 
by an inter-organizational 
CRM infrastructure, 
consisting of analytical, 
operational and 
collaborative system 
components. 
system supports 
development of a 
campaign using existing 
design templates, with 
which new campaigns can 
be more efficiently 
prepared. The campaign 
content is compiled in the 
form of blocks in a 
separate design template 
and linked with suitable 
keywords. The system 
compares these keywords 
with the available 
customer information and 
generates personalized 
content for each customer 
in the target group. In 
addition to obtaining 
further 
information on customer 
interests, the relevance of 
individual articles or 
offers can be determined 
using click-tracking. 
Case: IBM 
Title of the cooperative marketing program: “Smarter Planet” 
 
Background: International Business Machiness, abbreviated IBM and nicknamed "Big Blue", is a multinational computer 
technology and IT consulting corporation headquartered in Armonk, New York (USA). The company is one of the few 
information technology companies with a continuous history dating back to the 19th century. IBM manufactures and sells 
computer hardware and software (with a focus on the latter), and offers infrastructure services, hosting services, and consulting 
services in areas ranging from mainframe computers to nanotechnology.  In a joint engagement, IBM and Nokia Siemens 
Networks designed and built a SOA-based service creation and delivery platform that enables Globe Telecom (from Philippines) 
to rapidly and cost-effectively create service offerings from reusable service components. Globe Telecom, the number two 
mobile communication services provider in the Philippines, with 27 million customers, recognized that the most effective way to 
attract and retain the value-conscious Philippine mobile customer was to spur action through time-limited marketing promotions. 
In such an environment, success comes to the fast, nimble and intelligent—defined by the ability to target market opportunities 
with tactical campaigns, monitor their effectiveness and fine tune them in short order. That is exactly how Globe Telecom—the 
number two provider in the Philippines, with 27 million customers—is approaching the competitive challenge. Globe specifically 
recognized that the most effective way to attract and retain the value-conscious Philippine mobile customer was to spur action 
through time-limited marketing promotions—for example, reload HSDPA service with PHP30 and get 24 hours unlimited SMS 
product. Call it opportunistic marketing in the extreme. While Globe’s marketing staff had no shortage of creative promotional 
ideas—or the energy to carry them out—the company’s heavy reliance on its traditional vendors (particularly IN) to develop new 
services put a major drag on its agility. Under a typical scenario, it took roughly 10 months and most often several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to develop and bring a new service to market. Moreover, the fact that each of Globe’s lines of business 
operated its own service creation silo made the creation of bundled, composite service promotions equally complex due to 
integration requirements. 
 
Source: Globe Telecom: Gaining marketing agility with smart promotions 
Available: http://www-01.ibm.com/software/success/cssdb.nsf/CS/JSTS-7Z7K7B?OpenDocument&Site=default&cty=en_us  
subject tool object goal result 
IBM IBM and Nokia Siemens Networks 
designed and built a SOA-based service 
creation and delivery platform that enables 
Globe Telecom (from Philippines) to 
rapidly and cost-effectively create service 
offerings from reusable service components. 
 
Globe Telecom 
needed to reach 
a new level of 
agility in the 
creation and 
management of 
promotional 
Expected 
one-year 
payback 
period; 600 
percent 
increase in 
promotion 
Globe is using the Toolbox to 
seize customer opportunities is 
through the intelligent sensing 
needs, and the ability to respond 
to it in a targeted, timely and 
compelling way. The key to 
opportunistic marketing is 
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Solution Components 
Framework  
Service Provider Delivery Environment 
(SPDE) 
Software  
IBM WebSphere  
IBM Tivoli  
IBM Rational 
Servers  
IBM BladeCenter 
Services  
IBM Sales and Distribution  
IBM Software Group 
 
Smarter Telecommunications—Gaining 
tactical agility with smarter promotions  
 Instrumented: Information 
delivered from the customer handset 
enables Globe to measure the success of 
promotional activity and ongoing behavior.  
 Interconnected: Using SOA to 
abstract connections between the network 
and IT systems enables Globe to 
dramatically simplify service creation.  
 
 Intelligent: Using information 
gathered from handsets, Globe is able to 
identify the optimal service promotion for 
each customer—and the best time to deliver 
it.  
service 
offerings. 
effectiveness; 
more than 95 
percent 
reduction in 
the time and 
cost of 
developing 
new 
promotions 
awareness. Using the Toolbox 
solution, Globe’s marketers can 
configure triggers that 
automatically detect when, for 
example, a customer’s 
promotional use of three hours 
worth of high-speed data service 
is minutes from expiring. At that 
point, Globe can deliver a 
personalized, time-sensitive 
marketing promotion—the right 
offer, at the right time—thereby 
substantially improving uptake 
rates, and minimizing a 
customers chance of letting their 
balance reach zero, and 
ultimately improving market 
share. 
 
Globe’s adoption of flexible 
service delivery is a powerful 
example of how “long-tail” 
promotions—those that are 
generally short lived, highly 
targted, and able to be created 
cheaply and rapidly—are 
emerging as the primary engine 
of long-term revenue growth and 
profitability for telcos. The 10 
months and several hundred 
thousand dollars it used to 
require to create a new service is 
now down to an average of 
thousands and less than a week 
from conception to execution—a 
level of efficiency that enables 
Globe to offer several 
promotions per week. On the 
strength of the low cost and 
flexibility enabled by the 
Toolbox solution, Globe expects 
to achieve full payback on its 
investment in less than a year. 
Case: New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) 
Title of the cooperative marketing program: “Energy $mart program” 
 
Background:  New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA), a public benefit corporation funded 
by state utility- ratepayer System Benefits Charges, operates the New York Energy $mart initiative. This initiative includes an 
Home Performance with Energy Star (HPwES) program that encourages comprehensive energy upgrades in existing one- to four-
unit residential homes through an independent network of home-improvement contractors accredited by the Building 
Performance Institute (BPI).1 To participate, a homeowner contacts a contractor from the list of approved contractors available 
on the Energy $mart website, and the contractor then serves as a one-stop shop—performing a home energy assessment, 
installing energy improvements, and offering HPwES financing and rebate options. NYSERDA offers a range of incentives to 
encourage contractors to participate in the HPwES program including discounts on BPI certification, subsidies for diagnostic 
equipment, listing on the Energy $mart website, access to consumer financing options and incentives, use of NYSERDA 
marketing materials, referrals/leads from NYSERDA’s public awareness campaigns, and co-operative advertising 
reimbursements. Most of these incentives are performance-based, which allows NYSERDA to encourage scale, reward 
performance, and maximize its resources. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2012 Volume 28, Number 3 
370 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
Source: Driving Demand for Home Energy Improvements 
Fuller, M., C. Kunkel, M. Zimring, I. Hoffman, K.L. Soroye, and C. Goldman. LBNL-3960E. September 2010.  
This case study is part of a larger report available here: http://drivingdemand.lbl.gov/  
subject tool object goal result 
New York 
State Energy 
Research and 
Development 
Authority 
(NYSERDA 
While contractors are the key point of 
customer contact, Energy $mart runs an 
extensive marketing campaign (involving 
television, radio, newspaper, direct mail, 
public relations, and special events) to build 
recognition for HPwES and other NYSERDA 
programs encouraging residential energy 
efficiency. NYSERDA’s HPwES advertising 
is intended strictly to help catalyze the 
development of a robust market for the 
HPwES program, not to extend NYSERDA’s 
own brand. Contractors mention that this 
singular focus has contributed to the success 
of establishing the HPwES brand in New 
York. NYSERDA couples its general HPwES 
marketing with cooperative advertising 
incentives that reimburse contractors for a 
portion of their own advertising expenses. The 
reimbursement rates and caps are a function of 
the number of upgrades a contractor completes 
and range from 25% to 50% of a given 
advertising expense up to a maximum of 
$150,000 annually per contractor. 
 
Point-of-Sale Training and Messaging  
NYSERDA operates a one-day training 
program in sales and marketing that teaches 
contractors skills on communicating the 
importance of HPwES and a whole-house 
approach to energy efficiency. This training 
focuses on the customer experience and 
addresses some of the key hurdles to 
converting leads into jobs. Experienced 
whole-home energy-efficiency contractors 
note that programs often spend a lot of time on 
technical training but not nearly enough on 
showing contractors how to make a living 
performing energy efficiency improvements. 
HPwES programs typically add overhead 
costs to businesses and contractors must be 
able to educate homeowners and communicate 
the benefits of a whole-home approach to 
energy efficiency to beat out their competitors. 
While a number of messages have been 
explored, the Get Energy $mart and HPwES 
advertising campaigns focus on saving money. 
NYSERDA has done extensive focus-group 
analysis and found that about three in four 
people say that understanding the amount of 
money is most effective in encouraging them 
to invest in home energy improvements. 
HPwES cooperative 
advertising incentives 
allow NYSERDA to 
leverage its 
advertising dollars 
and control the 
message while 
harnessing  
contractors to sell the 
program. Contractors 
benefit from the 
financial assistance 
and NYSERDA’s 
broader HPwES 
branding campaign. 
Leveraging 
contractors’ 
ability to sell 
home energy 
upgrades 
Since 2001, over 
32,000 home energy 
upgrades worth more 
than $247 million 
have been completed 
through HPwES by 
approximately 250 
participating 
contractors3. These 
improvements have 
saved over 22 
million kWh and 
over 1 million 
MMBTU to date. All 
of the program’s 
active contractors 
have used 
NYSERDA 
incentives to earn 
BPI certifications. 
Since 2003, HPwES 
penetration of New 
York’s home 
remodeling market 
has climbed from 
less than 0.5% to 
approximately 3% 
annually. 
NYSERDA has paid 
almost $3.5 million 
to contractors since 
the cooperative 
advertising initiative 
began in 2001. This 
public spending 
enhances 
contractors’ ability 
to convert marketing 
expenditures into 
jobs and has been 
leveraged into over 
$10 million of total 
contractor spending 
on outreach. Over 
20% of active 
HPwES contractors 
used the cooperative 
marketing in 2010. 
NYSERDA is 
considering 
developing 
templates that will 
create uniformity 
and benefit smaller 
contractors, who 
have been less active 
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in using these 
incentives. In 
addition to helping 
contractors 
piggyback on 
NYSERDA’s 
HPwES branding 
efforts, these 
incentives help them 
market their services 
directly to customers 
and capitalize on the 
inherent value of the 
contractor-customer 
relationship in 
recruiting new 
customers and 
converting leads into 
comprehensive 
upgrades. 
Case: Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
Title of the cooperative marketing program: “HP Online-To-Store” 
 
Background:  HP is an American multinational information technology corporation headquartered in Palo Alto, California, USA 
that provides products, technologies, software’s, solutions and services to consumers, small- and medium-sized businesses 
(SMBs) and large enterprises, including customers in the government, health and education sectors. Bill Hewlett and Dave 
Packard founded the company in a one-car garage in Palo Alto. Currently, HP is the world’s leading PC manufacturer, operating 
in nearly every country. It specializes in developing and manufacturing computing, data storage, and networking hardware, 
designing software and delivering services. Major product lines include personal computing devices, enterprise, and industry 
standard servers, related storage devices, networking products, software and a diverse range of printers, and other imaging 
products. HP markets its products to households, small- to medium-sized businesses and enterprises directly as well as via online 
distribution, consumer-electronics and office-supply retailers, software partners and major technology vendors. HP also has 
strong services and consulting business around its products and partner products. 
Source: HP Online-to-Store Case Study 
Available: http://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/insights/library/studies/hp-online-to-store-case-study/  
subject tool object goal result 
HP Co-op advertising is a key strategic marketing 
platform, where manufacturers such as HP 
partner with retailers to drive sales. Google 
can help advertisers build, manage and 
measure results of a digital co-op marketing 
program, targeted at the vast and engaged 
online audience. HP partnered with a national 
retailer to launch the digital co-op program 
(APT). The campaign was conducted for 4 
weeks in 2010.  
 
APT has partnered with over 50 global 2000 
leaders to test proposed initiatives, learn from 
results, accurately predict the impact of 
decisions, and maximize profits. 
 
Test vs. Control Methodology 
1.Geographically diverse test markets spread 
across the country were served Google search 
ads for HP branded terms and non-branded 
keywords. The control markets were not 
served search advertising related to these 
keywords. 
Google partnered 
with Applied 
Predictive 
Technologies (APT) 
to evaluate the sales 
lift with high 
significance. 
Quantify the 
impact of an 
HP 
computing 
digital co-op 
search 
marketing 
campaign on 
in-store sales 
to make 
confident 
decisions 
about 
discretionary 
media and 
co-op budget 
allocation. 
530% overall return-
on-ad-spend for 
computing category 
($5.30 in sales for 
every $1.00 of 
search media). 
Search ads targeted 
to top 25% of 
markets based on 
specific store 
attributes produced 
1,090% return-on-
ad-spend for 
computing category. 
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Based on the above analysis, we can interpret and summarize the following findings regarding to crucial 
characteristics of cooperative sales promotion campaigns: 
 
 Successful brand manufacturers see an adding value through the collaboration with the retailers, because 
there are strongly interested in accomplishing customer relationship goals. 
 The most significant strategic factor that successful brand manufacturers consider is the increasing 
customers’ participation rates through loyal customers, as the result of individualized marketing. Best 
practice can be found at cases of cooperative sales promotion campaign, where content of cooperative 
marketing campaigns is based on customer’s socio-demographic and behavioral characteristics and his 
demands assessed in a continuous base. 
 The main objective for successful brand manufacturers is to approach customer's needs individually and to 
direct campaigns at specific target groups. 
 Because of an information overflow on the customer side, successful brand manufacturers see the relevance 
of marketing communication as a crucial success factor that requires innovative strategies towards a one-to-
one marketing approach. 
 The successful brand manufacturers agree on how customer-oriented processes should be implemented and 
how responsibilities for complete, or partial, processes should be regulated. 
 Intervening conditions of cooperative sales promotion campaigns may be grouped into two sections: i) 
technological impediments; and ii) organizational impediments. 
 Three contexts may influence the decision selection for successful brand manufacturers among different 
cost effective promotional tools: i) environmental (e.g. market conditions); ii) organizational (e.g. size of 
the two parties); and iii) level of ICT inadequate knowledge and technophobia.  
 
THE PROPOSITION: THE INTEGRATED BARGAINING SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
 
The extended “spais-papakonstantinidis-papakonstantinidis” model is presented in this section, including: i) 
the adjusted utility functions of the three “players”; ii) the definition of the “sensitization” process; ii) the referee 
solution, the optimal solutions for the three players and the constraints derived from the win-win-win 
papakonstantinidis model; iii) a presentation of the potential outputs from a bargaining process regarding to the 
sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” parties/players for different sales 
promotion offerings, based on a hypothetical numerical example; and iv) the role of configuring the “sensitized 
game” in order to deepen the understanding of the bargaining characteristics. 
 
We consider the business, which is the promotion planner as the A factor, with utility maximizing the 
profits ế in a given period t (t= 0, 1, 2, ….T) for the brand p (p= 1, 2, …P). We can compute the per period profit for 
the brand as: 
 
 
where: 
 
ếpt – is the per period profit; ế for the brand p at period t; 
Wpt – is the wholesale price W for the brand p at period t; 
2.To minimize noise, APT’s software 
compares each test store’s performance 
against a unique set of 10 control stores based 
on historical sales patterns, population density 
and geographic proximity. 
3.Using APT’s sophisticated analysis 
software, sales in each test store were 
compared to its control store group to 
determine the impact of paid search 
advertising on store and online sales. 
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cp – is the marginal cost for the brand p; 
Prpt – is the promotion, respectively of brand p at period t; 
Spt – is the business’ existed level of sales for brand p at period t; 
MDt– is the marketing decision cost at period t; 
SOptBS– is the objective of minimum sales volume for brand p at period t based on the break-even sales; 
 
 
 
 
     
We consider the marketing channel member as the B factor, with utility maximizing the profits ế for the 
marketing channel member from the partnership with the business in a given period t (t=0, 1, 2, ….T) for the 
marketing channel member (mediating, facilitating and sales) services to the business sop (sop=1, 2, …S). We can 
compute the per period profit for the marketing channel member services as: 
 
 
 
where: 
 
ếs – is the per period profit; ế for the marketing channel member for brand p at period t; 
cp – the marginal cost for the brand p for the marketing channel member; 
Prpt – is the promotion, respectively of brand p at period t; 
mspt – is marketing channel member’s existed level of sales for brand p at period t; 
MDt– is the marketing decision cost for the marketing channel member at period t; 
SOptBS– is the objective of minimum sales volume for brand p at period t based on the break-even sales; 
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We consider a market with utility-maximizing customers/consumers c who while visiting the point of sale 
in a given period t (t= 0, 1, 2, ….T) may choose to purchase the brand p (p= 1, 2, …P) within a category or may 
purchase a competitive brand (equivalent to not purchasing in the category, denoted by p = 0). The presence of the 
outside alternative in our model allows for the potential sales increase. We represent the utility that 
customer/consumer c derives from brand p, at period t. 
 
 
 
where: 
 
β0cst – is the utility that customer/consumer c derives from brand p at period t; 
Pst – is the regular price, respectively for brand p at period t; 
Xst – is a vector of factors that influence the customer’s/consumer’s utility including 
demand drivers such as seasonal factors at period t; 
Prst – is the promotion, respectively of brand p at period t; 
ξpt – is the mean utility to customers/consumers from brand p at period t due to unobserved variables; 
εcpt – is the loyalty of customers/consumers c to the brand p at period t. 
 
In Equation (3), we assume that the consumers/customers in each period will choose to purchase one of the 
brands at the point of sale p or settle for the outside good depending on the utility that they expect to derive from 
each choice alternative. So, their purchase choice is based on a consideration of the: a) characteristics of competitive 
brands, b) regular prices of competitive brands, c) promotional deals, d) seasonality, and e) marketing channel 
member’s corporate name. 
 
In order to deepen our understanding for the following constraints, we have to consider the relation 
between knowledge and behavior (which is strongly evidenced in the literature) and consists one of the prevailing 
assumptions of the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (the “interaction on bargain-behavior”).  The different 
examples of knowledge types synthesis and the resulted 1-1 behavior leads us to understand the bargain-behavior 
assumption, based on information given. From the other hand, bargainers’ information may be the dominant result 
of this cross-related knowledge types (Papakonstantinidis, 2011). 
 
Despite Nash “complete bargainers information” Harsanyi distinguished between complete and incomplete 
information, that each player has from the others bargaining behavior. Thus, the hypothesis of bargain-behavior 
interaction is very important in building the suggested “C Factor” following the Harsanyi’s Bayesian Theorem 
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original game can be replaced by a game “where nature first conducts a lottery in accordance with the basic 
probability distribution” (Harsanyi, 1967). This extension is mainly based on the “Harsanyi’s transformation”, with 
a difference: original bargain between two can be replaced by a game, where the C Factor first conducts a lottery in 
accordance with the basic probability distribution. In addition, the “C” factor should be seen as the result of a “new” 
suggested bargaining behavior, coming from sensitization process (Papakonstantinidis, 2011; 2007; 2004a; 2004b; 
2003; 2002). In such a context, the C party/player is given in terms of a continuous sensitization process, tending to 
sensitization itself, inside the customers. In accordance to Papakonstantinidis proposal (2011), the heart of the 
analysis for a bargaining solution in a cooperative promotion campaign must be the configuration of how the 
“sensitized game” (G**) is formed and developed. Such an analysis (according to Papakonstantinidis, 2011) based 
on Harsanyi’s definition of game [who considered the: i) set of players; ii) set of actions for each player; iii) types of 
the players decided by the function; iv) available actions for each player; and v) payoff function of each player] must 
also consider a sensitization coefficient of Ti (see the following definition of Harsanyi). 
 
The game definition by Harsanyi’s (1967): 
 
The game is defined as:  , where 
 
1. N is the set of players. 
2. Ω is the set of the states of the nature. For instance, in a card game, it can be any order of the cards. 
3. Ai is the set of actions for player i. Let . 
4. Ti is the types of player i, decided by the function . So for each state of the nature, the 
game will have different types of players. The outcome of the players is what determines its type. Players 
with the same outcome belong to the same type. 
5.  defines the available actions for player i of some type in Ti. 
6. is the payoff function for player i. More formally, let 
, and . 
7. pi is the probability distribution over Ω for each player i, that is to say, each player has different views of 
the probability distribution over the states of the nature. In the game, they never know the exact state of the 
nature. 
 
The pure strategy should satisfy for all ti. So the strategy for each player only 
depends on his type, since he may not have any knowledge about other players' types. And the expected payoff to 
player i for such strategy profile is: . 
Let Si be the set of pure strategies,  
 
Next, we define the “C party/player” in terms of a continuous sensitization process, with demographic 
and/or pshychographic characteristics, in accordance to Siguaw and Enz (1999). These may be seen as the output of 
the continuous sensitization process and perfect information (the sensitization), an assumption that also considered 
strongly by Kunter’s model (2012) and it is common by many other models (Kunter, 2012). Based on the win-win-
win papakonstantinidis model can be presented: lim Pi(S) Qi(S) Ri(S) = max Pi Qi Ri   (i) 
where: 
 
Pi(S) – strategy for “A player” under the probability distribution Pi 
Qi(S) – strategy for “B player” under the probability distribution Qi  
Ri(S) –.strategy for “C player” under the probability distribution Ri  
 
Instead of the ad hoc solutions discussed so far, one may consider allocation mechanisms derived from the 
theory of cooperation as developed in game theory. Our case is equivalent to a cooperative three-players-game. The 
theory of cooperative games is concerned with finding a referee solution that will be accepted by all three 
cooperating players: 
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The constraints presented below (8), (9) and (10): 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above, the three “players” should only share the additional profit that results from the 
cooperation while receiving in advance that part of the profit that they could have achieved anyway in the case of 
non-cooperative behavior. The rationale behind this is that the profit can’t be shared in total because the players 
have different threat points, i.e. profits in the case of non-cooperation. It is thereby plausible to share only the 
additional profit resulting from the cooperation. Constraints (8), (9) and (10) ensure that the players only accept 
solutions that are better than the one they could achieve in the case of non-cooperation. For our case, marketing 
managers have to search for a solution that maximizes the additional joint profit from cooperation (i.e. by operating 
a cooperative sales promotion campaign) over the respective profits in the case of non-cooperation (i.e. by operating 
separate sales promotion campaigns). Table 4 shows the presentation of the potential outputs from a bargaining 
process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” parties/players for 
different sales promotion offerings based on a hypothetical numerical example: 
 
 
Table 4: A presentation of the potential outputs from a bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative 
sales promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” – “the sharing problem” for 5 sales promotion offerings in accordance to 
the assumptions of the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model based on a hypothetical numerical example 
Sales 
promotion 
offerings 
Share 
for A 
(%) 
Share 
for B 
(%) 
Utility for 
“A” 
Utility for 
“B” 
Utility for 
“A” and “B” 
(“A”x“B”) 
Share 
for C 
(%) 
Utility 
for “C” 
Utility for 
“A”, “B” and “C” 
(“A” x “B” x “C”) 
A. 90 4 1 71 71 6 1 71 
B. 80 13 2 70 140 7 2 280 
C. 70 22 5 68 340 8 3 1020 
D. 60 31 10 64 640 9 4 2560 
E. 50 40 16 60 960 10 5 4800 (MAX) 
F. 41 50 23 52 1196 9 4 4784 
Note: 
 The less shares for “A” and “B” parties/players the more share for “C” party/player. 
 Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared to each other. They express the fear of breaking down the 
agreement. If “A” party/player needs more the “agreement” than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept any form 
of agreement. 
 
 
Considering the definition of cooperative advertising (see in Introduction), we can state that cooperative 
sales promotion is an arrangement where “A” party/player (e.g. a manufacturer) pays for some cost the sales 
promotion undertaken by a retailer for manufacturer’s brands. The above hypothetical numerical example includes 
cost share for “A” party/player from 41-90% and for “B” party/player from 52-71%. The critical role of the “C” 
party/player (the customer), as the “third win” in the suggested bargaining solution analysis regarding to the 
“sharing problem” is the share cost that the customer is willing to undertake for the promotion offering in order to 
get the units of utility that needs/desires. This means that the customers will try to maximize their utility by 
acquiring the specific promotion offering for a cost share that are willing to undertake. Therefore, the cost shares of 
“A” and “B” that are willing to undertake directly affect the share cost and the units of utility for “C” party/player.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, which is conceptual in nature with strong practical implications, author’s intention was to 
examine the possibility to investigate win-win-win papakonstantinidis model in order to develop an integrated 
bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns. Based on previous theoretical 
extensions (Spais and Papakonstantinidis, 2011; Spais, Papakonstantinidis and Papakonstantinidis, 2009), this study 
presented an integrated bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal allocation of a promotion budget in a 
cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. This integrated bargaining solution analysis 
included: a) three (3) adjusted utility functions, considering the parameters of sales response budgeting method, the 
break-even sales analysis and the  marketing channel member’s trade promotion goals; b) the referee solution, the 
optimal solution for the “three players” and the constraints; c) the definition of the third win in terms  of a 
continuous sensitization process and perfect information; and d) the presentation of the potential outputs from a 
bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” 
parties/players for different sales promotion offerings. The basic initial assumption of this study is that different 
problems met in cooperative promotion planning requires adjusted bargaining solution analyses based on the win-
win-win approach (including the “third win” for  customers) and should not based on the traditional win-win. 
Encouragingly, the review of the modern literature and the critical case study confirmed the need for a win-win-win 
approach in cooperative sales promotion planning in vertical marketing channels. No study, until now, has offered 
such an innovative and integrated bargaining solution analysis conceptualization for promotion management 
decisions in vertical marketing channels. 
 
The literature showed that cooperative advertising has been used by many industries for decades and 
continues to play a key promotional role for many manufacturers, retailers and retail customers. This is proven by 
significant increase of dollars spent on cooperative advertising. This increase in spending volume and the overall 
increase in the significance of cooperative advertising seems to motivate scholars, researchers, authors and thinkers, 
globally to explore more the role and use of cooperative advertising in practice, the last years. Although literature 
clearly shows the raising issue of reinforcing customers’ participation in marketing management activities of 
customer-centric organizations (such as: idea generation, idea screening, concept development and testing, process 
design, test marketing, building promotion campaigns etc.), (e.g. Awa, 2010; Hu, Jianyou & Na, 2010; Fang, 2008; 
Payne, Storbacka & Frow, 2008; Chen & Lu, 2007; Etgar, 2007; Lusch, Vargo & O’Brien, 2007; Galbraith, 2005; 
Hip & Grupp, 2005; Piller, 2005; Alam, 2002; Wind & Rangaswamy, 2001; Sheth, Sisodia & Sharma, 2000; Johne 
& Storey, 1998; Sundbo, 1997; Youngdahl & Kellogg, 1997; Wilkstrom, 1995; Dabholkar, 1990; Bowen, 1986; 
Lovelock & Young, 1979) unfortunately there is no theoretical framework including the customer (as a “third party” 
or “third player”) in a cooperative marketing or promotion planning process. The concept of including the third 
party, as the third “win” in a traditional “win-win” approach for cooperative marketing and promotion campaigns 
was presented for the first time in the marketing literature in 2009 (Spais, Papakonstantinidis & Papakonstantinidis, 
2009). 
 
The ‘win-win-win spais-papakonstantinidis-papakonstantinidis model’ is a methodological tool for conflict 
resolution, especially in the case of decision-making, or in forming "instant reflection winning strategies" the 
BARGAIN (which is the frame) in vertical marketing channels for cooperative promotion management decisions. 
Marketing managers must realize that building a strong competitive advantage in a market mainly depends on the 
trust links among the partnerships in vertical marketing channels. Cohesion in the vertical marketing partnership in 
the marketing channel may be measured by the diversification Rate (R*) from strict rules: From this point of view, 
customers’ intervention is useful, so as to diversify these “rules” at customized level adjusting them to their needs, 
wants, consuming identity, including communication codes, customs, ethics, culture. The ‘win-win-win spais-
papakonstantinidis-papakonstantinidis model’, as a vertical marketing channels’ bargaining solution analysis for 
cooperative promotion management decisions can facilitate customers to “readjust” bargaining rules in each market, 
through a sensitization process: Community of customers is defined as a discrete spatial/cultural entity at its 
sensitization process’ limit. 
 
Future research tries may find see as a research challenge by examining the innovative bargaining solution 
analysis under different real case studies and under different assumptions. Quiet interesting could be an examination 
of the bargaining solution analysis by considering some of Kunter’s (2012) assumptions in different market 
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structure. For example: i) different per-unit cost of production for the members of the vertical marketing channel 
(excluding the customer); and ii) demand which retail price and non-price marketing effort on players/parties A and 
B simultaneously affect. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The basic initial assumption of this study is that different problems met in cooperative promotion planning 
requires adjusted bargaining solution analyses based on the win-win-win approach (including the “third win” for  
customers) and should not based on the traditional win-win. 
 
The research intention was to examine the possibility to investigate win-win-win papakonstantinidis model 
in order to develop an integrated bargaining solution analysis for vertical cooperative sales promotion campaigns. 
Based on previous theoretical extensions (Spais and Papakonstantinidis, 2011; Spais, Papakonstantinidis and 
Papakonstantinidis, 2009), this study presented an integrated bargaining solution analysis for cases of optimal 
allocation of a promotion budget in a cooperative sales promotion campaign in vertical marketing channels. This 
integrated bargaining solution analysis included: a) three (3) adjusted utility functions, considering the parameters of 
sales response budgeting method, the break-even sales analysis and the  marketing channel member’s trade 
promotion goals; b) the referee solution, the optimal solution for the “three players” and the constraints; c) the 
definition of the third win in terms  of a continuous sensitization process and perfect information; and d) 
presentation of the potential outputs from a bargaining process regarding to the sharing of the cooperative sales 
promotion cost among “A”, “B” and “C” parties/players for different sales promotion offerings.  
 
Based on the assumptions of the ‘win-win-win papakonstantinidis’ conceptualization, the limitation in 
contexts such as the cooperative promotion programs, is that utility assessment and cost-utility analyses such as 
costs/quality-adjusted expected profits model from the partnership for A and B parties/players and the C party/player 
(for customers/consumers) are frequently presented to demonstrate the value of many utility options in the 
marketing literature. The “C” party/player produces a new behavioral type that converges the interests of both sides. 
By converting, a binomial distribution (p, 1-p) into a trinomial distribution, (p1, p2 and 1-p1-p2) combined with 
three utility function “prices”. However, utility indicators require various methods that introduce significant 
methodological challenges, which directly influence the results and ensuing cooperative promotion management 
decisions in vertical marketing channels. Encouragingly, the review of the modern literature and the critical case 
study confirmed the need for a win-win-win approach in cooperative sales promotion planning in vertical marketing 
channels. 
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